- Solana Foundation partners with Project Eleven to prototype quantum‑resistant transactions on a dedicated testnet.
- The pilot deploys post‑quantum digital signatures end‑to‑end, showing they can work at scale without sacrificing network performance.
- Project Eleven runs a full quantum‑threat assessment across Solana’s core infrastructure, wallets and validator security.
- The work is aligned with new NIST post‑quantum standards and long‑term migration paths away from Ed25519 as quantum computing matures.
Solana is taking a concrete step toward a post‑quantum future by experimenting with transactions that can resist attacks from powerful quantum computers. In collaboration with security firm Project Eleven, the Solana Foundation is trialing new cryptographic schemes on a dedicated testnet designed specifically for this purpose.
Rather than waiting for quantum hardware to become an immediate danger, Solana’s team and their partners are using this controlled environment to test how quantum‑safe signatures behave under realistic network conditions. The idea is to explore migration paths early, so that if and when quantum threats become real, the ecosystem is not caught off guard.
Solana and Project Eleven: building a quantum‑ready testnet
The Solana Foundation has formalized a partnership with Project Eleven, a specialist in crypto security for the post‑quantum era, to prototype quantum‑resistant transactions on a Solana testnet. Before writing any new code, Project Eleven carried out an in‑depth quantum threat assessment focused on how future advances could impact Solana’s core components.
This review went well beyond a narrow code audit. It covered validator infrastructure, user wallets and the long‑term cryptographic assumptions that underpin Solana’s consensus and transaction model. The goal was to understand which parts of the stack are most exposed if large‑scale quantum computers become viable.
Armed with that analysis, Project Eleven then deployed post‑quantum digital signatures across a fully functional Solana testnet. In this setup, an entire transaction lifecycle – from the user’s wallet signing operation to on‑chain verification by validators – is replaced with algorithms designed to withstand quantum attacks.
According to the teams involved, the experiment demonstrated that end‑to‑end quantum‑resistant transactions are not just a theoretical concept on Solana. They can be executed in a way that is both practical and scalable, keeping throughput in line with what users expect from the network.
That outcome is noteworthy because post‑quantum cryptography is widely perceived as heavier and more resource‑intensive than traditional schemes. The testnet results suggest that, at least for Solana’s architecture, the trade‑offs may be manageable without gutting performance.
From Ed25519 to post‑quantum signatures: what is actually changing?
Like many major blockchains, Solana currently relies on elliptic‑curve cryptography, using the Ed25519 signature scheme to secure its transactions. This design is robust against today’s classical computers, but under realistic quantum assumptions it becomes vulnerable, because algorithms such as Shor’s could in principle derive private keys from exposed public keys.
In practice, that means a future quantum‑capable attacker might be able to reconstruct a user’s private key from their public key once it has appeared on‑chain. With that private key, the attacker could sign arbitrary transactions and move funds without the real owner’s consent. The threat is hypothetical today, but it is serious enough that many ecosystems are exploring alternatives.
Solana’s collaboration with Project Eleven aims to test exactly those alternatives. The testnet uses post‑quantum signature algorithms that are designed so that even a powerful quantum computer cannot feasibly invert the underlying math. For users, the visible experience can remain similar – they still sign a transaction – but under the hood the cryptography looks very different.
Running this on a testnet allows the team to evaluate not just cryptographic strength but also the operational impact: how large the signatures are, how much bandwidth they consume, how quickly validators can verify them and how these factors influence block propagation and overall network capacity.
Alongside these experiments, the project is also examining what new address formats and migration routes might be required so that assets can move safely from today’s schemes to quantum‑resistant ones without forcing a disruptive cut‑over.
NIST post‑quantum standards and performance trade‑offs
The work on Solana’s testnet comes shortly after the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) approved three post‑quantum cryptography standards in August 2024: FIPS 203, 204 and 205. These documents serve as blueprints for organizations that need a formal path away from classical public‑key encryption and signatures.
Performance, however, remains a critical issue. In 2024, Cloudflare benchmarked FIPS 204 against Ed25519 – the scheme Solana currently uses – and RSA‑2048. Their tests indicated that FIPS 204 is almost five times more expensive than Ed25519 when it comes to creating signatures, but roughly twice as fast to verify. RSA‑2048, meanwhile, signs slower than both and verifies only slightly faster than FIPS 204.
For a high‑throughput blockchain such as Solana, these metrics are not academic details. They directly influence validator workloads, hardware requirements and ultimately the degree of decentralization, since heavier cryptography can raise the bar for running a node.
The early testnet results reported by the Solana Foundation and Project Eleven indicate that quantum‑resistant schemes can be integrated without crippling throughput. The full performance profiles and choices of specific algorithms have not been exhaustively detailed in public statements, but the message is that the technology is already usable at scale in a realistic setting.
That said, both teams frame this as an ongoing line of research rather than a finished product. Further tuning, auditing and comparison across multiple post‑quantum candidates will be needed before any of these tools can be recommended for mainnet adoption.
Risk timelines: how far away is the quantum threat?
Even among cryptographers and protocol designers, there is no single agreed timeline for when quantum computers might threaten today’s blockchain cryptography. Ethereum co‑founder Vitalik Buterin has suggested there is around a 20% probability that currently deployed schemes could be broken by 2030, a horizon that would require relatively fast progress in quantum hardware.
Other experts are more conservative. Figures such as Adam Back, a long‑time cryptographer cited in the original Bitcoin white paper, have argued that it may take another 20 to 40 years before Bitcoin or similar networks face a truly practical quantum attack. Research from companies like Google, which has published updated estimates on the resources needed to break RSA with quantum machines, has helped keep this debate active.
Despite the uncertainty, many large networks are treating post‑quantum planning as a matter of long‑term data integrity rather than short‑term panic. Blockchains are meant to preserve value and transaction history over decades, so the bar for “future‑proof” security is significantly higher than for typical web applications.
In that context, Solana’s strategy with Project Eleven is to move early, while also acknowledging that the immediate risk remains limited. The current work is framed as preparation: mapping threat models, testing migration options and building operational muscle memory before the pressure of a real‑time emergency.
This attitude is shared, to varying degrees, across the wider crypto ecosystem. Ethereum developers have been relatively quick to discuss potential countermeasures, while some analysts argue that Bitcoin’s more rigid governance model could make a large‑scale migration to quantum‑safe schemes politically and socially challenging, even if the technical pieces are known.
Internal assessments, wallets and validator security
As part of the collaboration, Project Eleven carried out a comprehensive risk review that spans the entire Solana stack. This analysis looks at how quantum capabilities could affect not only raw cryptographic primitives but also infrastructure design, key management and user‑level practices.
The scope includes user wallets, which are often the weakest link from a practical security standpoint. A future migration to quantum‑resistant addresses will likely require wallet software to support new key types, prompt users to rotate their keys and offer clear guidance on which funds still sit behind vulnerable schemes.
Validator operations are another central focus. Validators must be able to verify large volumes of signatures quickly, so any new post‑quantum algorithm has to fit within Solana’s tight performance envelope. Changes here might affect hardware recommendations, bandwidth usage and block production strategies.
The assessment also revisits Solana’s core cryptographic assumptions – for example, how long certain keys remain exposed on‑chain, and which parts of the protocol rely on assumptions that might not hold in a quantum setting. By surfacing these questions early, the network can plan phased updates instead of emergency patches.
Alongside the testnet focused on classic post‑quantum schemes, the Solana ecosystem is also exploring approaches based on hash‑based signatures, which are generally considered robust against quantum attacks. This work is intended to complement, not replace, the experiments currently underway with Project Eleven.
Industry context and Solana’s broader roadmap
From a broader industry perspective, Solana is not alone in taking quantum threats seriously, but its approach is relatively hands‑on. By running a live testnet with quantum‑resistant signatures, the network is effectively stress‑testing migration scenarios that other projects may only be discussing in theory.
Within Solana itself, this initiative sits alongside other technical efforts aimed at long‑term resilience, including work on additional client implementations and upgrades to the consensus layer. The Foundation has emphasized that security is not just about surviving today’s attacks, but about ensuring that assets and transaction histories remain intact over decades.
At the same time, the quantum‑resistance project is largely decoupled from short‑term market performance. While Solana continues to see new institutional use cases – from stablecoin settlements to tokenized assets – its native token, SOL, has recently traded at multi‑month lows, illustrating that adoption metrics and price action can move on very different tracks.
Other major networks are watching the same technological horizon. Many are evaluating post‑quantum signature schemes, rethinking address formats and exploring how to encourage users to migrate funds without creating excessive friction. The differences lie mostly in pace, governance structure and how much experimentation they are comfortable doing on live or near‑live networks.
Against that backdrop, Solana’s joint work with Project Eleven can be seen as an early, practical attempt to bridge the gap between academic post‑quantum research and real‑world blockchain deployments. The testnet shows that quantum‑resistant transactions can run at scale; the next challenge will be deciding when, how and under what conditions to bring elements of that design closer to mainnet.
Viewed together, these efforts portray an ecosystem that is trying to get ahead of an eventual shift in cryptographic standards rather than reacting under pressure. By combining formal standards from bodies like NIST, performance data from infrastructure providers and hands‑on testing in its own environment, Solana is laying groundwork for a transition in which quantum‑resistant security becomes a built‑in feature rather than an emergency add‑on.
